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Abstract—This paper introduces two metrics (cycle-based and
memory-based metrics), grounded on a dynamical game-theoretic
solution concept called sink equilibrium, for the evaluation,
ranking, and computation of policies in multi-agent learning.
We adopt strict best response dynamics (SBRD) to model selfish
behaviors at a meta-level for multi-agent reinforcement learning.
Our approach can deal with dynamical cyclical behaviors (unlike
approaches based on Nash equilibria and Elo ratings), and is
more compatible with single-agent reinforcement learning than
α-rank which relies on weakly better responses. We first consider
settings where the difference between largest and second largest
underlying metric has a known lower bound. With this knowledge
we propose a class of perturbed SBRD with the following
property: only policies with maximum metric are observed with
nonzero probability for a broad class of stochastic games with
finite memory. We then consider settings where the lower bound
for the difference is unknown. For this setting, we propose a
class of perturbed SBRD such that the metrics of the policies
observed with nonzero probability differ from the optimal by
any given tolerance. The proposed perturbed SBRD addresses
the opponent-induced non-stationarity by fixing the strategies of
others for the learning agent, and uses empirical game-theoretic
analysis to estimate payoffs for each strategy profile obtained due
to the perturbation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation and problem description: Multi-agent policy
evaluation and learning are long-standing challenges in multi-
agent reinforcement learning (MARL) since agents interact
and learn in a complex environment simultaneously through,
competition such as in Go [27], cooperation such as learning
to communicate [11], or some mix of the two [16]. This
paper introduces two metrics for the evaluation and ranking of
policies in multi-agent interactions, grounded on a dynamical
game-theoretic solution concept called sink equilibrium first
introduced by Goemans et al. in [13]. We aim at developing
new learning paradigms with a finite memory to achieve
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desirable convergence properties for certain classes of stochas-
tic games. More specifically, we formulate the interactions
of multiple agents by stochastic games and then analyze
them in meta-level as meta-games (i.e., normal-from games
with unknown payoffs [24]). Instead of focusing on atomic
decisions, meta games abstract the underlying games and are
centered around high-level agents’ interactions. Each strategy
for an agent is a set of specific hyperparameters or policy
representations. Then, we propose two metrics for the joint
strategies based on the memory size of the learning system
and the notion of sink equilibria. We further design a class
of MARL algorithms, called perturbed strict best response
dynamics (SBRD), such that the frequently observed strategies
in the learning system either have the maximum underlying
metrics or have metrics that are within any given difference
from the maximum, depending on the prior information about
the underlying games.
Literature review: In single-agent RL, the long-term reward
received by the agent can be used to evaluate policies such as
Q-learning [33]. However, in MARL, the evaluation of policies
becomes less obvious as each agent aims to maximize its own
reward and the reward itself is also affected by the strategies
of others. For multi-agent policy evaluation, the Elo rating
system [8] is a predominant approach, but it fails to handle
intransitive relations between the learning agents (e.g., the
cyclic behavior in Rock-Paper-Scissors). On the other hand,
the Nash equilibrium in game theory is the most common tool
for evaluating strategies of non-cooperative agents. However,
the recent work [25] claims that there seems little hope of
using the Nash equilibrium in general large-scale games due
to its limitations, such as computational intractability, selection
issues, and incompatibility with dynamical systems. To address
some of the issues above, Omidshafiei et al. [25] proposed an
alternative evaluation approach, called α-rank, which leverages
evolutionary game theory to rank strategies in multi-agent
games. Specifically, α-rank defines an irreducible Markov
chain over joint strategies and constructs the response graph
of the game. The ranking of the joint strategies is obtained
by computing the stationary distribution of the Markov chain.
Recent extensions of α-rank can be found in [24], [26].
Despite this progress, how to evaluate multi-agent policies in
a principled manner remains largely an open question [26].
In traditional reinforcement learning, a single agent im-
proves her strategy based on the observations obtained by
repeatedly interacting with the stationary environment. In a
simplest form of MARL, known as independent RL (InRL),
each agent independently learns its own strategy by directly us-
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2ing single-agent learning algorithms and treating other agents
as part of the environment [30]. In this case, the environment
is no longer stationary from the perspective of any individual
agent due to the independent and simultaneous learning. To
tackle this problem, people create a stationary environment
for the learning agent by fixing the strategies of other agents
in previous works. For example, a unified game-theoretic
approach, known as policy-space response oracles (PSRO), is
introduced in [15] and further investigated in [24], where best
responses to a distribution over the policies of other agents
are computed. In [1], the authors present decentralized Q-
learning algorithms for the weakly acyclic stochastic games,
where the environment keeps stationary for the learning agent
over each exploration phase. The above methodology in which
a stationary environment is created mainly focuses on the
evolution or convergence of finite high-level strategies rather
than primitive actions. Thus, these games are abstracted as
normal-form games with unknown payoffs, also known as
meta-games or strategic-form games [20], [24].
The idea of playing best responses to stationary environment
highlighted above has drawn significant attention in the area of
learning in strategic-form games. In the well-known fictitious
play [4], at each time step, each agent plays a best response
to the empirical frequency of the opponents’ previous plays.
In double oracle [21], each agent plays a best response to the
Nash equilibrium of its opponent over all previous learned
strategies. In adaptive play [36], each agent can recall a finite
number of previous strategies and at each time step, each agent
samples a fixed number of elements from its memory and plays
a best response to the sampled strategies. The best response
dynamics is a simple and natural local search method: an
arbitrary agent is chosen to improve its utility by deviating
to its best strategy given the profile of others [9], [29].
Best-response based algorithms are guaranteed to converge
to the set of Nash equilibria in many games of interest,
e.g., fictitious play and double oracle in two-agent zero-sum
games [4], [21], adaptive play in potential games [36] and
best response dynamics in weakly acyclic games [37]. How-
ever, ensuring convergence to a Nash equilibrium in multi-
agent general-sum games is a great challenge [9]. Moreover,
although pure Nash equilibria (PNE) are preferable to mixed
Nash equilibria (MNE), (e.g., in meta-games [25] and auctions
[13]), PNEs may not exist, e.g., in weighted congestion games
[13], generic games [6], and multi-agent general-sum normal-
form games.
Motivated by α-rank [25], we propose to use the concept
of sink equilibrium introduced in [13] to evaluate policies in
multi-agent settings. The sink equilibrium is a sink strongly
connected component (SSCC) in the strict best response graph
associated with a game. The strict best response graph has a
vertex set induced by the set of pure strategy profiles, and its
edge set contains myopic strict best response by any individual
agent. We propose two metrics for strategy profiles based on
sink equilibria: when a strategy belongs to a sink equilibrium,
it has a positive metric dependent on the property of the sink
equilibrium and the underlying metric; otherwise, it has zero
metric. Similar to α-rank, sink equilibria include PNEs as a
special case and are guaranteed to exist [13]. Compared with a
Nash equilibrium, a sink equilibrium has several advantages:
1) it focuses on pure strategy profiles which are preferable
in meta-games; 2) it can deal with dynamical and intransitive
behaviors; 3) it is always finite. Most of current works about
sink equilibria focus on the computational complexity and
price of anarchy for various games [2], [10], [22].
Like in Nash equilibrium selection problem, it is appealing
to design algorithms that converge to a sink equilibrium with
some maximum underlying metric. The strict best response
dynamics, defined as a walk over the strict best response
graph, guarantees that for any initial strategy profile, the
convergence to a sink equilibrium is achieved [13]. Similar to
stochastic adaptive play [36], we propose a class of perturbed
strict best response dynamics such that the strategies with the
maximum metric are found with high probability. We analyze
the perturbed SBRD through its induced Markov chain and use
stochastic stability as a solution concept, which is a popular
tool for studying stochastic learning dynamics in games [3],
[7], [14], [19], [36]. Similar to PSRO [15], we use empirical
game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) to study strategies obtained
due to the perturbation, through simulation in complex games
[32]. In an empirical game, expected payoffs for each strategy
profile are estimated and recorded in an empirical payoff table.
Contributions: In this paper, we study policy evaluation and
learning algorithms for MARL. By adopting concepts from
game theory, we introduce two policy evaluation metrics with
better properties than the Elo rating system [8], Nash equilibria
and α-rank [25]. By combining stochastic learning dynamics
with empirical game theory, we also propose a class of learning
algorithms with good convergence properties for MARL. The
contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) Based on sink equilibria induced by the strict best re-
sponse graph, we introduce two policy evaluation metrics,
namely the cycle-based metric and the memory-based
metric, for strategy evaluation in multi-agent general-sum
games. Policies in the same sink equilibrium have the
same underlying metric. We also establish the connec-
tions between the concepts of coarse correlated equilibria
[19], PNEs and the sink equilibria.
2) Under the assumptions that the sink equilibrium with the
maximum underlying metric is unique and the difference
between the maximum and second largest metrics has
a known lower bound, we propose a class of perturbed
SBRD such that the policies with the maximum metric are
observed frequently over a finite memory. Specifically,
when the memory size is sufficiently large, we consider
the cycle-based metric and give a lower bound of the
memory size and a class of perturbation functions to guar-
antee convergence. When the memory size is predefined,
we consider the memory-based metric and give a class
of perturbation functions to guarantee convergence.
3) Furthermore, when the lower bound of the difference
between the maximum and second largest metrics is un-
known, we propose a class of perturbed SBRD such that
the metrics of the policies observed with high probability
are close to the maximum metric within any prescribed
tolerance.
3Paper organization: In Section II, we model the MARL as
a stochastic game and then at a high-level, reformulate it as
a meta-game by considering stationary deterministic policies.
In Section III, based on the sink equilibrium induced by strict
best response graph, two multi-agent policy evaluation metrics
are introduced. In Section V, we propose training algorithms to
seek the best policies according to both metrics, respectively.
We conclude the paper in Section VI.
Notation: For any finite set S, let |S| denote its cardinality.
For any positive integer z, let [z] denote the set of positive
integers smaller than or equal to z, i.e., [z] = {1, 2, · · · , z}.
Let rand(S) denote an element uniformly selected from a
finite set S. Let R, R≥0, R>0, N and N>0 be the set of
reals, nonnegative reals, positive reals, nonnegative integers
and positive integers, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We present here preliminaries in game theory.
A. Stochastic Games
Stochastic games have long been used in MARL to model
interactions between agents in a shared, stationary environ-
ment for developing MARL algorithms [18]. A Markov de-
cision process (MDP) is a stochastic game with only one
agent. A finite (discounted) stochastic game G1 is a tuple
(N,X ,A, P,R, β), where:
1) N is a finite set of n agents;
2) X is a finite set of states;
3) A = A1 × · · · × An, where Ai is a finite set of actions
available to agent i;
4) P : X ×X ×A 7→ [0, 1] is the transition probability func-
tion, where P (x′ |x, a) is the probability of transitioning
from state x ∈ X to state x′ ∈ X under action profile
a ∈ A;
5) R = R1 × · · · × Rn, where Ri : X × A 7→ R is a
real-valued immediate reward for agent i;
6) β = β1×· · ·×βn, where βi ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor
for agent i.
Such a stochastic game induces a discrete-time controlled
Markov process. At time t ∈ N, the system is in state xt,
and each agent chooses an action ait. Then, according to
the transition probability P (· |xt, at), the process randomly
transitions to state xt+1 and each agent receives an immediate
payoff Ri(xt, at), where at := (a1t , . . . , ant ) ∈ A is the action
profile at time t.
A policy (or strategy) for an agent is a rule of choosing an
appropriate action at any time based on the agent’s informa-
tion. We will consider the stationary deterministic policies for
all agents. A stationary deterministic policy si for agent i is a
mapping from X to Ai [1], that is, ait = si(xt), and the only
information available to agent i at time t is the current state
xt. We denote the set of such policies by Si, which is finite
with |Si| = |X ||Ai|.
Let S = S1 × · · · × Sn be the set of joint strategies, and
S−i = ×j 6=iSj denotes the set of possible strategies of all
agents except agent i. We also use the notation s−i ∈ S−i
to refer to the joint strategy of all agents except agent i, and
sometimes write the joint strategies as s = (s−i, si) for any
s ∈ S and i ∈ N .
Given any joint strategy s ∈ S , each agent i receives an
expected long-term discounted reward
V is (x) = E
(∑
t∈N
(βi)tRi(xt, at) |x0 = x
)
, ∀x ∈ X , (1)
where at = (a1t , . . . , a
n
t ) and a
i
t ∈ Ai is selected according to
si(xt), for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N. The function V is (x) is the
value function of agent i under the joint strategy s with the
initial state x. The objective of each agent i is to find a policy
si ∈ Si that maximizes V is (x) for all x ∈ X . If only agent i
is learning and the other agents’ strategies are fixed, then the
stochastic game G1 reduces to an MDP and it is well-known
that there exists a stationary deterministic policy for agent i
that achieve the maximum of V is (x) for all x ∈ X and any
fixed s−i ∈ S−i [17].
B. Meta Games
We are interested in analyzing interactions in G1 at a higher
meta-level. A meta game is a simplified model of complex in-
teractions which focuses on meta-strategies (or styles of play)
other than atomic actions [25], [31], [32]. For example, meta-
strategies in poker may correspond to ”passive/aggressive” or
”tight/loose” strategies. The (finite) meta game G2, induced
by a stochastic game G1 defined in Section II-A, is a tuple
(N,S, J) such that:
1) N is a finite set of n agents;
2) S = S1×· · ·×Sn is a finite joint policy space, where Si
is a finite set of stationary deterministic policies available
to agent i with |Si| = |X ||Ai|;
3) J = J1×· · ·×Jn, where J i : S 7→ R is a payoff function
of agent i defined as the average of the sum of the value
functions V is (x) over all x ∈ X , i.e., for any s ∈ S,
J i(s) =
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
V is (x),
and J(s) = (J1(s), . . . , Jn(s))>.
The objective of each agent i is to find a policy si ∈ Si that
maximizes J i(s). We focus on the meta game G2 in this paper.
Since different agents may have different payoff functions and
each agent’s payoff also depends on the strategies of the other
agents, we here adopt the notion of equilibrium to characterize
those policies that are person-by-person optimal [1].
A standard approach in analyzing the performance of sys-
tems controlled by non-cooperative agents is to examine the
Nash equilibria. Note that in the stochastic game G1 or its
induced meta game G2, a strategy si can be learned by a
machine learning agent i and the function V is (x) captures the
expected reward of agent i when playing against the others in
some game domain. The PNE for the meta game G2 is defined
as follows.
Definition 1 (Pure Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile s∗ ∈
S is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if J i(s∗) ≥ J i(si, s∗−i)
for all strategies si ∈ Si and all agents i ∈ N .
4It is known that pure Nash equilibria do not exist in many
games [13]. Specifically, for games where multiple agents
learn simultaneously, there is usually no prior information
about the structure of payoff functions. Thus, it is not guaran-
teed that a PNE exists in these games and the PNE may not
be an appropriate solution concept to evaluate policies.
III. STRICT BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS AND SINK
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we introduce the strict best response dynam-
ics and the sink equilibrium, as a preparation for the evaluation
of multi-agent policies in the next section.
A. Motivation
The progress made on reinforcement learning has opened
the way for creating autonomous agents that can learn by inter-
acting with surrounding unknown environments [1], [11], [15],
[27]. For single-agent reinforcement learning, the interactions
between the agent and the stationary environment are often
modeled by an MDP, i.e., the same action of the agent from the
same state yields the same (possibly stochastic) outcomes. This
is a fundamental assumption for many well-known reinforce-
ment learning algorithms, such as Q-learning [28] and deep
Q-network [23]. However, for multiple independent learning
agents, the environment is not stationary from each individual
agent’s perspective and the effects of an action also depend on
the actions of other agents [30]. As a result, good properties
of many single-agent reinforcement learning algorithms do not
hold in this case.
We deal with this non-stationarity in multi-agent learning
by creating a stationary environment for each learning agent.
Specifically, we only allow one agent to learn at each learning
phrase and fix all the other agents’ strategies, as in [1], [24],
[25]. Under this framework, any single-agent reinforcement
learning algorithm can be adopted. Moreover, by focusing
on the meta-level (meta game G2), we use a game-theoretic
concept called strict best response dynamics [13], [29] to
analyze the multi-agent learning process and further introduce
the sink equilibrium [13].
B. Strict Best Response Dynamics and Sink Equilibrium
A strategy s∗i ∈ Si is called a best response of agent i to
a strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i if
J i(s∗i, s−i) = max
si∈Si
J i(si, s−i).
Note that for any fixed s−i ∈ S−i, agent i solves a stationary
MDP problem. Moreover, since X and Si are both finite, agent
i always has at least one stationary deterministic best response
to any s−i ∈ S−i [17]. We denote the set of stationary
deterministic best responses by
Bi(s−i) =
{
s∗i ∈ Si | J i(s∗i, s−i) = max
si∈Si
J i(si, s−i)
}
,
which is nonempty and finite.
Definition 2 (Strict best response graph). A strict best re-
sponse graph GS = (S, ES) of a meta game G2 is a digraph
a1b1 a1b2 a1b3
a2b1 a2b2 a2b3
(a)
CCE PNE sink equilibrium
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) A strict best response graph for a meta game with two agents,
where one of them has two strategies {a1, a2} and the other has three
strategies {b1, b2, b3}. The sequence ((a1, b2), (a2, b2), (a2, b3)) is a strict
best response path (SBRP) and {(a1, b1)} is the unique sink equilibrium. (b)
Relationships between different concepts of equilibrium.
where each node represents a joint strategy profile s ∈ S and
a directed edge ess′ from s ∈ S to s′ ∈ S exists in ES if s
and s′ differ in exactly one agent’s strategy (say i ∈ N ) and
s′i is a best response with respect to s−i, i.e., s′i ∈ Bi(s−i),
and J i(s′) > J i(s).
Definition 3 (Strict best response path). A finite sequence L
of joint strategies (s1, s2, . . . , sc) (c ∈ N>0) is called a strict
best response path (SBRP) if, for each τ 1, one of the two
conditions holds: 1) sτ is a PNE; 2) there is an edge from sτ
to sτ+1 in the strict best response graph GS.
For simplicity, we write s ∈ L when a joint strategy s is
on an SBRP L. An SBRP L is a directed cycle, if the only
repeated nodes on L are the first and last nodes, or all nodes
on L are the same PNE. An example of the strict best response
graph is shown in Fig. 1(a), where the sequence in red is an
SBRP.
A strict best response dynamics (SBRD), also called strict
Nash dynamics, is a walk on the strict best response graph
[13]. In the rest of this paper, we stick with the random strict
best response dynamics: at a given joint strategy, each agent
is equally likely to be selected to play a strict best-response
strategy [37] if it exists. Moreover, the strict best response
strategy of the agent is obtained by a single-agent reinforce-
ment learning algorithm with all other agents’ strategies fixed,
and we assume that every strict best response strategy of the
agent is selected with equal probability.
Next, we introduce the concept of sink equilibrium first
proposed in [13] with a little modification, to examine the
performance of a broad class of meta games, including those
without pure Nash equilibria.
Definition 4 (Sink equilibrium). A set Q ⊂ S of joint policies
is a sink equilibrium of a strict best response graph GS =
(S, ES), if Q is a sink strongly connected component (SSCC)
in the graph.
Let the set of all sink equilibria be Q ⊂ 2S . The sink
equilibria characterize all policies that are visited with non-
zero probability after a sufficiently long random strict best-
response sequence. Any random strict best-response sequence
converges to a sink equilibrium with probability one [13]. In
Fig. 1(a), {(a1, b1)} is the unique sink equilibrium.
1In the next section, we will formally define τ as exploration phrase.
5IV. SINK EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION AND
MULTI-AGENT POLICY EVALUATION
In this section, we present our first main result on the
properties of sink equilibrium and introduce two multi-agent
policy evaluation metrics.
A. Sink equilibrium characterization
The condensation digraph of any digraph is acyclic and
every acyclic digraph has at least one sink [5]. Thus, it follows
from Definition 4 that the sink equilibrium always exists in
finite meta games, like (mixed) Nash equilibrium, i.e., Q is
nonempty and finite. Moreover, sink equilibria generalize pure
Nash equilibria in that a PNE is a singleton sink equilibrium
of the game.
Next, we discuss the relationships between sink equilibrium
and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE). The CCE, which
has been broadly studied in the area of learning in games
[3], [19], is more general than PNE as Fig. 1(b) shows. The
CCE always exists in finite games, because the (mixed) Nash
equilibrium is included in the CCE. Let q = {qs}s∈S ∈ ∆(S)
be a probability distribution over the joint strategy space S,
where ∆(S) denotes the simplex over S. A joint strategy s is
in the support of q if qs > 0.
Definition 5 (Coarse correlated equilibrium). A probability
distribution q ∈ ∆(S) is a coarse correlated equilibrium
(CCE) if
∑
s∈S J
i(s)qs ≥
∑
s∈S J
i(s′i, s−i)qs for all strate-
gies s′i ∈ Si and all agents i ∈ N .
The following proposition establishes the connections be-
tween CCE, PNE and the sink equilibrium.
Proposition 6 (Connection with the CCE). In finite meta
games, sink equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria satisfy:
(i) There exist meta games such that any sink equilibrium is
not equal to the support of any CCE;
(ii) There exist meta games such that the support of a CCE
is not a subset of any sink equilibrium;
(iii) There exist meta games such that the PNE is a proper
subset of the intersection of the support of a CCE and a
sink equilibrium.
Proof. Regarding (i), we construct a meta game as in Fig.
2 with 0 <  < 1, where row and column agents aim to
maximize their payoffs. We draw the associated strict best
response graph on the right according to the payoff matrix.
This game has a unique sink equilibrium (four joint strategies
in green):
Q =
{
(a1, b2), (a2, b2), (a2, b3), (a1, b3)
}
.
Suppose that there is a CCE q such that the sink equilibrium
Q is equal to the support of q, i.e., qs > 0 if and only if s ∈ Q.
Let
q(a1,b2) = y1, q(a2,b2) = y2, q(a2,b3) = y3, q(a1,b3) = y4,
where yi > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and
∑4
i=1 yi = 1. We take
s′1 = a3 and s′2 = b1 in Definition 5. If q is a CCE, then we
have
y2 + y4 ≥ (1− )(y1 + y2 + y3 + y4) = (1− ),
y1 + y3 ≥ (1− )(y1 + y2 + y3 + y4) = (1− ),
(2)
b1 b2 b3
a1 1, 1−  0, 1 1, 0
a2 0, 1−  1, 0 0, 1
a3 0, 0 1− , 0 1− , 1 a3b3a3b2a3b1
a2b3a2b2a2b1
a1b1 a1b2 a1b3
Fig. 2. A meta game with two agents, where the left is the payoff matrix and
the right is the associated strict best response graph. The four joint strategies
in green form a unique sink equilibrium of the left graph.
which leads to a contradiction
∑4
i=1 yi > 1 for 0 <  <
1
2 .
Therefore, the sink equilibrium is not equal to the support of
CCE.
Regarding (ii), consider a meta game whose payoff matrix
is a part of the payoff matrix in Fig. 2, where player one
has strategies {a1, a3} and player two has strategies {b1, b2}.
Take  = 13 and then (0, 1) for the row agent and (
2
5 ,
3
5 )
for the column agent form an MNE which is support by
{(a3, b1), (a3, b2)}. Note that this meta game only has a unique
sink equilibrium {(a3, b2)}. Thus, the conclusion follows from
the fact that the MNE is contained in the CCE [19].
Regarding (iii), consider a meta game whose payoff matrix
is a part of the payoff matrix in Fig. 2 where only four
strategies a1, a2, b2 and b3 are involved. It can be verified that
( 14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ) is a CCE. Since these four joint strategies form a
sink equilibrium, then we can claim that the PNE is a proper
subset of the intersection set of sink equilibrium and CCE.
The sink equilibrium and CCE are not special cases of each
other and the PNE is a proper subset of their intersection set
from Proposition 6. The relationship between sink equilibrium
and CCE is shown in Fig. 1(b). Thus, the learning algorithms
in games for seeking the CCE cannot be directly applied for
seeking sink equilibria with good properties.
B. Multi-agent policy evaluation
The problem of multi-agent policy evaluation is challeng-
ing due to several reasons: strategy and action spaces of
agents quickly explode (e.g., multi-robot systems [34], [35]),
models need to deal with intransitive behaviors (e.g. cyclic
best-responses in Rock-Paper-Scissors, but at a much higher
dimension [25]), types of interactions between agents may be
complex (e.g., MuJoCo soccer), and payoffs for agents may
be general-sum and asymmetric.
Motivated by the recently-introduced α-rank strategy [25],
which essentially defines a walk on a perturbed weakly better
response graph, we use a walk on the strict best response
graph, i.e., SBRD, to evaluate the policies in multi-agent
settings. Similar to Nash equilibria, even simple games may
have multiple sink equilibria. Thus, we need to solve the sink
equilibrium selection problem.
We introduce two evaluation metrics for joint strategies and
sink equilibria in the following. Define the performance of a
joint strategy s ∈ S by
W (s) =
∑
i∈N
wiJ i(s), (3)
6where wi ∈ R≥0 is the weight associated with agent i and∑n
i=1 w
i = 1. If we only care about the performance of agent
i, then we can take wi = 1 and wj = 0 for all j 6= i. If we treat
every agent equally and care about the average performance,
then we can take wi = 1n for all i ∈ N . The performance of
an SBRP L is defined as the average performance of all joint
strategies in L, i.e.,
W (L) = 1|L|
∑
s∈L
W (s). (4)
We first introduce a cycle-based metric for policy evalua-
tion. For a sink equilibrium Q ∈ Q, let C(Q) be the set of
directed cycles in the subgraph induced by Q. Moreover, if
Q = {s} is a singleton, then C(Q) = {s}.
Definition 7 (Cycle-based metric). The cycle-based metric
Mc(s) of a strategy s ∈ S is the worst performance of all
directed cycles in C(Q) if s ∈ Q for some sink equilibrium
Q ∈ Q and 0 otherwise. In other words,
Mc(s) =
{
minL∈C(Q)W (L) if s ∈ Q for some Q ∈ Q;
0 otherwise.
(5)
Furthermore, the cycle-based metric for a sink equilibrium
Q ∈ Q is defined by Mc(Q) = Mc(s) for any s ∈ Q.
We next introduce a memory-based metric for policy eval-
uation in the case when we can only store m ∈ N>0 joint
strategies. For a sink equilibrium Q ∈ Q, let M(Q) be the
set of SBRPs of length m in the subgraph induced by Q.
Definition 8 (Memory-based metric). Let m ∈ N>0 be the
memory length. The memory-based metric Mm(s) of a strategy
s ∈ S is the worst performance of all SBRPs of length m in
M(Q) if s ∈ Q for some sink equilibrium Q ∈ Q and 0
otherwise. In other words,
Mm(s) =
{
minL∈M(Q)W (L) if s ∈ Q for some Q ∈ Q;
0 otherwise.
(6)
Furthermore, the memory-based metric for a sink equilibrium
Q ∈ Q is defined by Mm(Q) = Mm(s) for any s ∈ Q.
The reason that we consider the worst performance for each
sink equilibrium in Definitions 7 and 8 is that the random
strict best response dynamics can move along any SBRP in
a sink equilibrium and the metrics give lower bound on the
achievable performance. Since Q is finite and nonempty, we
can rank all sink equilibria Q ∈ Q by the metrics Mc(Q) or
Mm(Q) and would like the SBRD to converge to the sink
equilibrium with the best performance.
V. MULTI-AGENT POLICY SEEKING
We next present our second main result on policy seeking.
Since we have introduced two metrics to evaluate multi-agent
policies, we propose training algorithms to seek the best
policies according to both metrics, respectively.
hτ
hLτ
hRτ
p(hτ )
sτ−m+1 sτ
J(sτ−m+1)
· · ·
· · ·
sτ−1
pR(hτ )
pL(hτ )
J(sτ−1) J(sτ )
memory subsystem
strategy selection
sτ , p(hτ )
sτ+1, J(sτ+1)
history update
learning
subsystem
Fig. 3. Sketch of the training system.
A. Training System
We first briefly introduce the framework of our training
system which consists of a learning subsystem and a memory
subsystem, shown in Fig. 3. The learning subsystem is a
training environment where multiple agents are learning and
empirical games are simulated [32]. In an empirical game,
expected payoffs for each complex strategy profile are esti-
mated and recorded in an empirical payoff table. The memory
subsystem is a finite memory unit for storing the learned joint
strategies.
The meta game G2 is played once in the learning subsystem
during each period τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . }, where τ is the exploration
phase [1]. At the exploration phrase τ , the learning subsystem
fetches the latest joint strategy sτ and the payoff matrix p(hτ )
(defined later) from the memory subsystem and combines them
with reinforcement learning and empirical games to generate a
new joint strategy sτ+1 and the related payoff J(sτ+1). Then,
the memory subsystem receives sτ+1 and J(sτ+1), and uses
a pruned history update rule to decide whether to store them.
The process iterates afterwards.
Our goal is to design algorithms such that after a long train-
ing period, the memory subsystem stores the joint strategies
that have the maximum underlying metrics with probability
one, regardless of the initial joint strategies.
B. Perturbed Strict Best Response Dynamics
The proposed perturbed SBRD is described in Table I.
Suppose that the memory subsystem possesses a finite memory
of length m, and can recall the history of the previous m joint
strategies and the associated payoffs. Let hτ and p(hτ ) be the
histories of joint strategies (called history state) and payoffs up
to exploration phrase τ in the memory subsystem, where hτ =
(sτ−m+1, . . . , sτ ) and p(hτ ) = (J(sτ−m+1), . . . , J(sτ )) ∈
Rn×m. Let H = Sm denote the space of history states, and
for any h ∈ H, let hL and hR be the leftmost and rightmost
m − 1 joint strategies of h, respectively. Similar notations
pL(h) and pR(h) are used for the payoffs. For example, for
hτ and p(hτ ), we have that hLτ = (sτ−m+1, . . . , sτ−1), h
R
τ =
(sτ−m+2, . . . , sτ ), pL(hτ ) = (J(sτ−m+1), . . . , J(sτ−1)) and
pR(hτ ) = (J(sτ−m+2), . . . , J(sτ )), as Fig. 3 illustrates. We
here emphasize that hτ can also be treated as a sequence of
joint strategies (sτ−m+1, sτ−m+2, . . . , sτ ) from sτ−m+1 to
sτ .
The training system is initialized by simulating G2 with a
random selected joint strategy s1 and then storing s1 and the
7associated payoff vector J(s1) into the rightmost of memory
subsystem. In the unperturbed process ( = 0), only steps 3),
4) and 6) of Table I are executed with ¯ = 0. In these three
steps, we update the history state under two conditions: if sτ
in current history state hτ is a PNE, then we store this PNE sτ
regardless of the new joint strategy sτ+1; if sτ is not a PNE
and (sτ , sτ+1) forms an SBRP, then we store sτ+1. When we
store sτ+1 into the memory subsystem, the history state moves
from hτ to hτ+1 by removing the leftmost element sτ−m+1
of hτ and appending sτ+1 as the rightmost element of hτ+1,
i.e., hτ+1 = (hRτ , sτ ) or hτ+1 = (h
R
τ , sτ+1). Similarly, when
we store sτ , then hτ+1 = (hRτ , sτ ). Otherwise, hτ+1 = hτ .
Similar operations are performed to update the history of the
associated payoffs p(hτ+1).
For the perturbed process ( > 0), we compute an explo-
ration rate ¯ as a function of the current payoff matrix p(hτ )
in steps 1) and 2) of Table I, where the feasible function f is a
mapping from Rn×m to R>0 whose form will be designed in
Definition 20. In this process, the strategy selection is slightly
perturbed by ¯ such that, with a small probability ¯ agent i
follows a uniform strategy (or, it explores). The step 5) of
Table I is executed when at least one agent explores, in which
case we need to run an empirical game [32] to obtain the
payoff vector J(sτ+1) corresponding to sτ+1 as the value
of payoff function J i(s) is unknown for all joint strategies
s ∈ S and all agents i ∈ N in advance. The history update
is also perturbed by ¯ such that with a small probability ¯
the learned strategy sτ+1 and the related payoff J(sτ+1) are
directly recorded.
We assume that in step 4) of Table I, the selected agent is
able to learn a best-response strategy. This can be achieved
by using some single-agent reinforcement learning algorithms
(for example, Q-learning [28]), as long as the exploration
phrase runs for a sufficiently long time [1]. Note that in the
first m plays of the game, the memory is not full. We consider
a sufficiently long exploration phrase τ such that τ > m. Thus,
after a long run, i.e., τ > m, the memory is always full and
the history state satisfies hτ ∈ H = Sm. Unless otherwise
specified, we have τ > m by default for all the proofs.
For the analysis below, we assume that the bound for each
agent’s payoff is known.
Assumption 9 (Payoff bound). Suppose that the agents’ payoff
functions are non-negative and bounded by Jmax > 0 from the
above, i.e., 0 ≤ J i(s) ≤ Jmax for all strategies s ∈ S and all
agents i ∈ N .
C. Background on Finite Markov Chains
Before presenting our main results, we provide some prelim-
inaries on finite Markov chains [7], [36]. In order to maintain
consistency with our analysis later, we use the same set of
symbols to represent the state space and the states as before in
this subsection. Let P 0 be the transition matrix of a stationary
Markov chain defined on a finite state space H and P  be a
regular perturbation of P 0 defined below [36].
Definition 10 (Regular perturbation). A family of Markov
processes P  is a regular perturbation of P 0 defined over
TABLE I
PERTURBED STRICT BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS
Initialize: Take p(h1) = 0n×m. Randomly select a strategy si1 fromSi for all i ∈ N . Then simulate G2 with s1 = (s11, . . . , sn1 ) and
x0 = x for all x ∈ X , and obtain the payoff vector J(s1) =
(J1(s1), . . . , Jn(s1))>. Store s1 and J(s1) into the system memory:
h1 = (hR1 , s1), p(h1) = (p
R(h1), J(s1)).
Learning process: At time-steps τ = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
1) (evaluation) Use a feasible function f : Rn×m → R>0 (defined
in Definition 20) to evaluate all the joint strategies in hτ by their
payoff matrix p(hτ ): κ = f(p(hτ ));
2) (exploration) Compute a payoff-based exploration rate: ¯ = κ;
3) (strategy selection) Select an agent from N randomly, say j.
Agent i ∈ N selects a new strategy as follows:
siτ+1 =

a best response with probability 1− ¯ if i = j,
rand(Si) with probability ¯ if i = j,
siτ with probability 1− ¯ if i 6= j,
rand(Si) with probability ¯ if i 6= j;
4) (reinforcement learning) If sjτ+1 needs to be a best response,
i.e., sjτ+1 ∈ Bj(s−jτ ), then
for many episodes do
Train sjτ+1 over s
−j
τ with x0 = x for all x ∈ X ;
Obtain J(sjτ+1, s
−j
τ ). Then, take J(sτ+1) = J(s
j
τ+1, s
−j
τ );
5) (empirical game) If there exists an i ∈ N such that siτ+1 is
obtained by rand(Si) in step 3) (that is, agent i explores), then
simulate the game G2 with the strategy profile sτ+1, and obtain
the payoff vector J(sτ+1);
6) (history update) With probability 1− ¯, the history follows the
update rule: if sτ is a PNE, then
hτ+1 = (h
R
τ , sτ ), p(hτ+1) = (p
R(hτ ), J(sτ ));
if sτ is not a PNE and Jj(sτ+1) > Jj(sτ ), then
hτ+1 = (h
R
τ , sτ+1), p(hτ+1) = (p
R(hτ ), J(sτ+1));
otherwise,
hτ+1 = hτ , p(hτ+1) = p(hτ ).
With probability ¯, the history explores with the update rule:
hτ+1 = (h
R
τ , sτ+1), p(hτ+1) = (p
R(hτ ), J(sτ+1)).
(7)
H, if there exists 1 > 0 such that the following conditions
hold for all h, h′ ∈ H:
(i) P  is aperiodic and irreducible for all  ∈ (0, 1];
(ii) lim→0 P hh′ = P
0
hh′ ;
(iii) P hh′ > 0 for some  > 0 implies that there exists an
r(h, h′) ≥ 0, called the resistance of the transition from
h to h′, such that
0 < lim
→0+
P hh′
r(h,h′)
<∞. (8)
Note that the resistance r(h, h′) = 0 if and only if P 0hh′ > 0.
Take r(h, h′) = ∞ if P hh′ = 0. Let GH = (H, EH) be the
digraph induced by the transition matrix P . For every pair
of states h, h′ ∈ H, the directed edge ehh′ exists in EH if
P hh′ > 0. Since P
 is irreducible for  > 0, it has a unique
stationary distribution pi satisfying pi>P  = pi>, pih > 0
and pi>1 = 1, and the digraph GH is strongly connected. We
consider the following concept of stability introduced in [12].
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Fig. 4. An example of h′-trees in case H containing four states, where the
graph GH in (a) consists of three h′-trees for some h′ ∈ H (in red) shown
in (b), (c) and (d).
Definition 11 (Stochastic ability). A state h ∈ H is stochas-
tically stable relative to the process P  if lim→0 pih > 0.
Note that pih is the relative frequency with which state h
will be observed when the process runs for a very long time.
Thus, over the long run, states that are not stochastically stable
will be observed less frequently compared to states that are,
provided that the perturbation  is sufficiently small. Moreover,
we emphasize here that lim→0 pih exists for all h ∈ H, which
will be shown in Lemma 13. It turns out that the W-graph
defined below is useful in analyzing stochastic stability of
states.
Definition 12 (W-graph). For any nonempty proper subset
W ⊂ H, a digraph g = (H, Eg) is a W-graph of GH =
(H, EH) if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) the edge set satisfies Eg ⊂ EH \ {ehh′ |h ∈ W, h′ ∈
H, h 6= h′};
(ii) every node h ∈ H \ W is the start node of exactly one
edge in Eg;
(iii) there are no cycles in the graph g; or equivalently, for
any node h ∈ H\W , there exists a sequence of directed
edges from h to some state h′ ∈ W .
Note that if W is a singleton consisting of h′, then a W-
graph g is actually a spanning tree of GH such that from every
node h 6= h′ there is a unique path from h to h′. We call such
a W-graph an h′-tree, as in [36]. We will denote by G(W)
the set of W-graphs. An example of h′-trees for some h′ ∈ H
when H contains four states, is shown in Fig. 4.
We now state Young’s results [36] for perturbed Markov
processes. Define the stochastic potential of state h by
γ(h) = min
g∈G(h)
∑
eh′h′′∈Eg
r(h′, h′′), (9)
where r(h′, h′′) is the resistance from h′ to h′′ defined in
Definition 10.
Lemma 13 (Perturbation and stochastic stability [36, Lemma
1]). Let P  be a regular perturbation of P 0 and pi be its
stationary distribution. Then
1) lim→0 pi = pi0 where pi0 is a stationary distribution of
P 0; and
2) h is stochastically stable (pi0h > 0) if and only if γ(h) ≤
γ(h′) for all h′ in H.
D. Policy Seeking
In this subsection, we propose the class of perturbed SBRD
algorithms as shown in Table I to seek the best policies
according to the underlying metrics.
The unperturbed ( = 0) and perturbed ( > 0) SBRDs
are two Markov chains over the set of history states H. For
consistency, we use the same symbols and concepts introduced
in Section V-C. Let P 0 and P  be the transition matrices of
the unperturbed and perturbed SBRDs, respectively.
We first consider the unperturbed SBRD P 0 and discuss
its connections with the sink equilibria of the mega-game
G2. For simplicity, we use s ∈ h to indicate that a joint
strategy s is recorded in a history state h. We let v denote
the number of sink equilibria in the meta-game G2 and
Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qv} denote the set of sink equilibria. For
each sink equilibrium Qi ∈ Q, we define an induced set Yi,
called recurrent communication class (RCC), of the history
states as follows:
Yi = {h ∈ H |h is an SBRP, ∀s ∈ h, then s ∈ Qi}. (10)
We summarize these induced RCCs as Y = {Y1, Y2, . . . , Yv}.
Next, we discuss the dynamic stability of the unperturbed
SBRD P 0.
Proposition 14 (Unperturbed process). For the unperturbed
SBRD P 0, each RCC Yi is an absorbing history state set, i.e.,
once the history state enters Yi, it will not leave Yi. As a result,
P 0 is an absorbing chain with v absorbing history state sets.
Proof. When  = 0, only steps 3), 4), and 6) of Table I are
executed. In step 6), if the latest joint strategy (i.e., sτ ) in hτ
is a PNE, then sτ will be appended. Thus after running for a
finite number of times, hτ only consists of this PNE, implying
that hτ ∈ Yi for some Yi ∈ Y . If sτ is not a PNE, then we
record sτ+1 only when it is an SBRP from sτ . Thus, it is
possible that after a finite run, hτ will be filled with an SBRP
with all involved joint strategies belonging to a non-singleton
sink equilibrium, if no PNE is visited in this run. Thus, in this
case, hτ ∈ Yi for some Yi ∈ Y and it will never leave Yi,
where Yi is defined in (10). From the above, each RCC Yi is
an absorbing history state set. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 14 shows that when P 0 runs for a long period
of time, the joint strategies in the memory subsystem all come
from one sink equilibrium. However, it is hard to predict which
sink equilibrium will be reached based on the initial joint
strategy s1. Thus, similar to the method in [7], we want to
design a class of perturbations to P 0 such that after a long
run, the perturbed SBRD P  guarantees that the joint strategies
with the maximum underlying metrics are observed in the
memory subsystem with high probability, regardless of the
initial joint strategies. In this paper, we use stochastic stability
as a solution concept, as in [3], [6], [7], [19].
First, motivated by the concept of mistake in [36], we
introduce the concept of exploration number for the transition
between two joint strategies, which plays a key role in the
following analysis.
Definition 15 (Exploration number). For any two joint strate-
gies s and s′, the exploration number e(s, s′) ∈ N from s to s′
9is the minimum number of agents required to explore in order
to achieve the transition under the SBRD P  from s to s′, plus
one if the history update has to explore to attach s′ through
(7).
For example, consider a 3-agent case and take two joint
strategies s = (s1, s2, s3) and s′ = (s′1, s′2, s′3). Suppose
that s is a PNE, s1 = s′1, s2 6= s′2, s3 6= s′3, and s′2, s′3 are
not best responses with respect to s, i.e., s′2 /∈ B2(s−2) and
s′3 /∈ B3(s−3). Note that both agent 2 and agent 3 have to
explore to achieve the transition from s to s′. Additionally, the
history update has to explore to attach s′ through (7), as s is
a PNE. Thus, the exploration number from s to s′ is given by
e(s, s′) = 2 + 1 = 3.
Next, we show that P  is a regular perturbation of P 0, and
give a bound for the resistance between two history states.
Lemma 16 (Perturbed process). The perturbed SBRD P  is
a regular perturbation of P 0 over the set of history states H,
and the resistance r(h, h′) of moving from h to h′ satisfies:
(i) if P hh′ > 0 and P
0
hh′ > 0, then r(h, h
′) = 0;
(ii) if P hh′ > 0 and P
0
hh′ = 0, then f(p(h)) ≤ r(h, h′) ≤
(n+ 1)f(p(h));
(iii) if P hh′ = 0, then r(h, h
′) =∞.
Proof. For the perturbed SBRD P  in Table I, the strategy
selection rule implies a positive transition probability between
any two joint strategies and the history update indicates that
the probability of adjoining a new joint strategy is also
positive. Thus, it is possible to get to any history state from any
history state in a finite number of transitions, which implies
that P  is irreducible. The history update also guarantees that
there always exists a history state h ∈ H such that P hh > 0, no
matter whether a PNE exists in the meta-game G2. Thus, P  is
aperiodic. Moreover, lim→0 P hh′ = P
0
hh′ is straightforward.
We check condition (iii) in Definition 10 below.
Regarding (i): If P hh′ > 0, we have h
R = h′L. Furthermore,
if P 0hh′ > 0, then r(h, h
′) = 0, i.e., there is no resistance, such
that (8) holds. Thus, (i) is obtained.
Regarding (ii), we denote h = (hL, s) = (s¯, hR) and h′ =
(h′L, s′). Then, P hh′ > 0 means h
R = h′L, and P 0hh′ = 0
means that from s to s′ there is at least one agent who explores,
that is, e(s, s′) ≥ 1. Notice that Definition 15 guarantees that
e(s, s′) ≤ n+1. By following the computation of P hh′ in [36,
Section 5] or [6, Section 5.2], the resistance from h to h′ is
given by r(h, h′) = e(s, s′)f(p(h)), which guarantees that (8)
holds. Thus, we have f(p(h)) ≤ r(h, h′) ≤ (n+ 1)f(p(h)).
Regarding (iii), since P hh′ = 0, then r(h, h
′) =∞ such that
(8) holds. From the above, we conclude that P  is a regular
perturbation of P 0. This completes the proof.
Since P  is irreducible, i.e., GH is strongly connected, we
can define the resistance of a path in GH from one node to
another as the sum of the resistances of the edges along the
path. According to Proposition 14 and Lemma 16, the RCCs in
Y are disjoint, and under the perturbed process P  they satisfy
the following three properties as in [36]: (i) from every history
state there is a path of zero resistance to at least one of the
RCCs Yi; (ii) within each RCC Yi there is a path of zero
h¯LKL1
⇐
z1(h) zK(h)
· · ·
· · ·
s1 s2 sm−1 sm
h
Fig. 5. Each history state h in an RCC Yi can be decomposed into z1(h) ∈ N
directed cycles of type L1, . . . , zK(h) ∈ N directed cycles of type LK and a
remainder h¯, where h¯ is an SBRP without containing any cycle (if nonempty)
and C(Qi) = {L1, . . . ,LK} is the set of directed cycles in Qi.
resistance from every history state to every other; (iii) every
edge exiting from Yi has positive resistance.
We define the performance of each history state h ∈ H as
the average performance of the joint strategies in h:
W (h) =
1
m
∑
s∈h
W (s), (11)
where W (s) is defined in (3) and characterizes the overall
performance of a strategy. Furthermore, the performance of
each RCC Yi is defined as the worst performance of the history
states in Yi:
W (Yi) = min
h∈Yi
W (h). (12)
Next we establish the connections between metrics of the
strategies proposed in Section IV-B and the performances of
the RCCs. Let L be the maximum number of joint strategies
in a directed cycle L for all sink equilibria in Q, i.e.,
L = max
Q∈Q
max
L∈C(Q)
|L|. (13)
Lemma 17 (Connections between performance and metrics).
For each RCC Yi ∈ Y , the following conditions hold:
(i) if the cycle-based metric is considered, then for any δ >
0, there exists
m¯δ =
LJmax
δ
, (14)
such that if m ≥ m¯δ , then
|W (Yi)−Mc(Qi)| = |W (Yi)−Mc(s)| ≤ δ, (15)
for all joint strategies s ∈ Qi;
(ii) if the memory-based metric is considered, then W (Yi) =
Mm(Qi) = Mm(s) for all joint strategies s ∈ Qi.
Proof. Regarding (i), if Qi is a singleton containing a unique
PNE s, then (10) indicates that Yi is also a singleton given
by {(s, s, . . . , s)}. Thus, according to (11) and (12), W (Yi) =
W (s). On the other hand, it follows from (4) and Definition 7
that Mc(s) = W (s), as C(Qi) = {s}. Thus, W (Yi) = Mc(s),
which satisfies (15).
If Qi is not a singleton, denote the set of directed cycles
in Qi by C(Qi) = {L1,L2, . . . ,LK} (K ∈ N>0), where
Lk (k ∈ [K]) is a directed cycle. Next, we show that the
performance of each history state h in Yi can be computed as
follows:
W (h) =
∑K
k=1 zk(h)|Lk|W (Lk) +
∑
s∈h¯W (s)
m
, (16)
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where zk(h) ∈ N and
∑K
k=1 zk(h)|Lk|+ |h¯| = m. The path h¯
is the remainder of h when all directed circles contained in h
are removed. The expansion (16) implies that the history state
h in Yi can be decomposed into many directed cycles (if exist)
and a remainder without containing any cycle (if nonempty),
as Fig. 5 shows. The details are as follows.
First, it follows from (10) that each history state h ∈ Yi can
be expressed as an SBRP (we take the starting time as τ = 1):
h = s1 → s2 → · · · → sm.
We move the joint strategy starting from s1 along the path
h. If the same joint strategy is revisited at time t2, i.e., there
exists a time instant t1 ∈ [1, t2) such that st1 = st2 . Then the
path st1 → · · · → st2 is a directed cycle of Qi. We remove
this directed cycle and obtain the remainder
h¯1 = s1 → · · · → st1 → st2+1 → · · · → sm. (17)
Then, we continue to move the joint strategy starting from st1
along the path h¯1. Similarly, we remove the directed cycle and
continue to move along the remainder h¯2. When sm is reached,
this method decomposes h into many directed cycles (if exist)
and a remainder h¯ without containing any cycle (if nonempty).
Thus, (16) is verified. Moreover, the remainder h¯ is a part of
a directed circle if nonempty, implying that |h¯| ≤ L.
Denote by L∗ the directed cycle in C(Qi) with the worst
performance, i.e., L∗ ∈ arg minL∈C(Qi)W (L), where W (L)
is computed by (4). Thus, (5) leads to Mc(s) = W (L∗) for
all joint strategies s ∈ Qi. By (3), (4) and Assumption 9, we
obtain
0 ≤W (s) ≤ Jmax, 0 ≤W (L∗) ≤ Jmax. (18)
For any δ > 0, let m¯δ be as in (14), and then it follows from
(12), (13), (16) and (18) that for any memory m ≥ m¯δ > 0
and s ∈ Qi, we have
W (Yi) = min
h∈Yi
W (h)
= min
h∈Yi
∑K
k=1 zk(h)|Lk|W (Lk) +
∑
s∈h¯W (s)
m
=
∑K
k=1 zk(h
′)|Lk|W (Lk) +
∑
s∈h¯′W (s)
m
≥
∑K
k=1 zk(h
′)|Lk|W (L∗)
m
= W (L∗)− |h¯
′|W (L∗)
m
≥W (L∗)− |h¯
′|Jmax
m
≥W (L∗)− LJmax
m
≥Mc(s)− δ,
(19)
where h′ ∈ arg minh∈YiW (h),
∑K
k=1 zk(h
′)|Lk|+ |h¯′| = m,
|h¯′| ≤ L and Mc(s) = W (L∗) for s ∈ Qi are used.
On the other hand, we consider a history state h∗ in Yi
which can be decomposed into z(h∗) ∈ N directed circles L∗
(if exist) and a remainder h¯∗ with |h¯∗| ≤ L. Then, according
to (11), (12), (16) and (18), for any memory m ≥ m¯δ > 0
and s ∈ Qi, we have
W (Yi) = min
h∈Yi
W (h) ≤W (h∗)
=
z(h∗)|L∗|W (L∗) +∑s∈h¯∗W (s)
m
≤ z(h
∗)|L∗|W (L∗) + |h¯∗|Jmax
m
= W (L∗) + |h¯
∗|(Jmax −W (L∗))
m
≤W (L∗) + LJmax
m
≤Mc(s) + δ.
(20)
where z(h∗)|L∗|+|h¯∗| = m and |h¯∗| ≤ L are used. Therefore,
(15) follows from (19) and (20).
Regarding (ii), according to the definition,M(Qi) is the set
of SBRPs of length m in the sink equilibrium Qi. According
to (10), we obtain that Yi =M(Qi). Thus, it follows from (4),
(6), (11) and (12) that W (Yi) = Mm(s) for s ∈ Qi, which
finishes the proof.
Note that Lemma 13 reveals that the stochastic stability of
a history state depends crucially on its stochastic potential
defined in (9). Next, we give lower and upper bounds on
the stochastic potentials of history states in the RCCs; these
bounds play an important role in our following analysis.
Lemma 18 (Bounds on the stochastic potential). For each
RCC Yi ∈ Y , the stochastic potential of a history state h
in Yi under the perturbed SBRD P , satisfies the following
properties:
(i) γ(h) = γ(h′) for all history states h′ ∈ Yi;
(ii) γ(h) satisfies γ¯i ≤ γ(h) ≤ (n+ 1)γ¯i, where
γ¯i =
∑
Yj∈Y\{Yi}
min
h′∈Yj
f(p(h′)).
Proof. Regarding (i), it directly follows from Lemma 2 in [36],
that is, all history states in an RCC Yi have the same stochastic
potential.
Regarding (ii), in any h-tree g, there is at least one history
state h′j in other RCC Yj (j 6= i) which needs to explore.
It follows from (ii) in Lemma 16 that the resistance of this
exploration is not less than f(p(h′j)). Thus, by considering (9)
and all RCCs Yj ∈ Y except Yi, we have
γ(h) ≥
∑
j∈[v]\{i}
f(p(h′j)) ≥
∑
Yj∈Y\{Yi}
min
h′∈Yj
f(p(h′)). (21)
Without loss of generality, we consider the case i = 1, i.e.,
the RCC Y1. Next, we will construct a special h-tree g0 rooted
at some node h ∈ Y1. In the unperturbed SBRD P 0, all nodes
(history states) in H can be classified into two categories:
Not-in-a-sink Hnot (blue) and In-a-sink Hin (pink), as Fig.
6(a) shows. Once the history state enters Hin, it will never
leave it if no exploration happens.
For the In-a-sink Hin, it can be decomposed into v smaller
disjoint parts, each of which corresponds to an RCC. In the
example shown in Fig. 6(a), there are three RCCs: Y1 (black),
Y2 (orange) and Y3 (yellow), i.e., v = 3.
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Each RCC Yj has a directed spanning tree gj rooted at a
node h∗j in Yj , where h
∗
j ∈ arg minh′∈Yj f(p(h′)). Also notice
that all edges in gj have zero resistance. For this example, as
Fig. 6(b) shows, the node h∗j is the white circle and the edges
in gj are in red. Since in this example Y1 is a singleton (i.e.,
h∗1), thus g1 is empty.
Based on the unperturbed SBRD P 0, we classify the Not-
in-a-sink Hnot into several smaller disjoint parts as follows:
the first part H1 is the set of history states in Hnot from which
there is a path of zero resistance to Y1; the second part H2 is
the set of history states in Hnot \ H1 from which there is a
path of zero resistance to Y2; the third part H3 is the set of
history states in Hnot \ (H1 ∪H2) from which there is a path
of zero resistance to Y3; in this way, Hnot is divided into v
disjoint parts H1,H2, . . . ,Hv , and Hj may be empty. For the
part Hj (if nonempty), we can choose the edges associated
with Hj such that for all h ∈ Hj , there is a unique path of
zero resistance without cycle from h to Yj . For this example, as
Fig. 6(c) shows, Hnot is divided into three parts: H1 (red), H2
(green) andH3 (purple). The transition paths of zero resistance
from h ∈ Hj to Yj are in red.
Finally, we build the paths from the RCCs Yj ∈ Y \ Y1 to
Y1. Note that for any h ∈ H, if the rightmost s of h belongs
to Q1, then h ∈ H1 ∪ Y1, because finite transitions of zero
resistance can lead h to Y1. Since the transition probability
between any two states and the probability of attaching a new
one are both positive, so h∗j can adjoin any joint strategy s.
Thus, h∗j can reach one node of H1 ∪ Y1 by one experiment
to attach a joint strategy s in Q1. Then, h∗j can reach Y1 by
continuing to move along the path by which this intermediate
node moves to Y1. By this way, we are able to construct an
h∗1-tree g0. For our example, the h
∗
1-tree g0 is shown in Fig.
6(d), where the one-step transitions of nonzero resistance from
h∗j (j 6= 1) to one node of H1 ∪ Y1 are in dashed red lines.
Note that in the constructed h∗1-tree g0, there are v − 1
explorations each of which is not greater than (n + 1)f(h∗j )
by the conclusion (ii) in Lemma 16. Since γ(h∗1) is not greater
than the sum of the resistances of g0 by (9), we have
γ(h∗1) ≤
∑
j 6=1
(n+ 1)f(p(h∗j ))
= (n+ 1)
∑
Yj∈Y\{Y1}
min
h′∈Yj
f(p(h′)),
(22)
where h∗j ∈ arg minh′∈Yj f(p(h′)) is used. Thus, the conclu-
sion follows from (21), (22) and the conclusion (i).
Definition 19 (δ-function). For any δ > 0, a function fδ :
R→ R>0 is a δ-function, if for any x ∈ R,
(i) fδ(x) is non-decreasing in x;
(ii) fδ(x+ δ) > (vn− n+ 1)fδ(x).
Definition 20 (Feasible function). For any δ > 0, a function
f : Rn×m → R>0 is δ-feasible if there exists a δ-function fδ
such that for any M = {Mij} ∈ Rn×m, the equality f(M) =
fδ(
1
m
∑m
j=1
∑n
i=1 wiMij) holds.
Y1 Y2
Y3
Hnot
Hin
(a) Full unperturbed SBRD
h∗1
h∗2
h∗3
g2 g3
(b) Pruned unperturbed SBRD
h∗1
h∗2
h∗3
H3H2H1
(c) Pruned unperturbed SBRD
h∗1
h∗2
h∗3
(d) Perturbed SBRD (an h∗1 -tree)
Fig. 6. An example for computing an upper bound of the stochastic potential
for a history state in an RCC.
We can design a δ-feasible function f by constructing a
δ-function fδ . For example, for any M ∈ Rn×m, we select
f(M) = fδ(x) = (vn− n+ 2) xδ , (23)
where x = 1m
∑m
j=1
∑n
i=1 wiMij . It can be verified that f in
(23) is a δ-feasible function.
We have the following assumption on the sink equilibrium.
Assumption 21 (Uniqueness). Suppose that the sink equilib-
rium Q∗ with the maximum metric Mc(Q∗) or Mm(Q∗) is
unique.
Next, we present the main results on stochastic stability of
the perturbed SBRD and propose a class of perturbations such
that the sink equilibria with the maximum cycle-based metric
can be observed frequently.
Theorem 22 (Maximum cycle-based metric). Let G2 =
(N,S, J) be an n-agent meta game on a finite joint strategy
space S. The training system has a memory of length m ∈ N>0
and consider the cycle-based metric Mc(s) in (5) for each joint
strategy s ∈ S. Suppose that Assumptions 9 and 21 hold. If
the following conditions are all true:
(I) there exists a δ0 > 0 such that Mc(Q∗) ≥ Mc(Qi) + δ0
for all sink equilibria Qi ∈ Q \ {Q∗};
(II) f is a δ-feasible function for some δ ∈ (0, δ0);
(III) the memory m is greater than or equal to
m¯δ =
2LJmax
δ0 − δ , (24)
then under the perturbed SBRD P ,
(i) a history state h is stochastically stable if and only if
h ∈ Y ∗;
(ii) as  → 0, a joint strategy s ∈ S is recorded in the
memory subsystem with nonzero probability if and only
if s ∈ Q∗,
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where Mc(Q∗) = maxQ∈QMc(Q) and Y ∗ is the induced
RCC of Q∗.
Proof. Regarding (i), for any 0 < δ < δ0, let m¯δ be as in
(24). Then if m ≥ m¯δ , it follows from (i) in Lemma 17 that
|W (Yi)−Mc(Qi)| = |W (Yi)−Mc(s)| < δ0 − δ
2
, (25)
for all joint strategies s ∈ Qi and all RCCs Yi ∈ Y .
For any Yi ∈ Y \ {Y ∗}, it follows from (25) and condition
(I) that
W (Y ∗) > Mc(Q∗)− δ0 − δ
2
≥Mc(Qi) + δ0 − δ0 − δ
2
= Mc(Qi) +
δ0 − δ
2
+ δ > W (Yi) + δ.
(26)
Since f is a δ-feasible function, it follows from (3), (11)
and Definition 20 that there exists a δ-function fδ such that
f(p(h)) = fδ(W (h)), (27)
for all h ∈ H. It follows from (12), (26), (27) and properties
(i) and (ii) in Definition 19 that
min
h∈Yi
f(p(h)) = min
h∈Yi
fδ(W (h)) < min
h∈Yi
fδ(W (h) + δ)
vn− n+ 1
=
fδ(minh∈YiW (h) + δ)
vn− n+ 1 =
fδ(W (Yi) + δ)
vn− n+ 1
≤ fδ(W (Y
∗))
vn− n+ 1 =
fδ(minh∈Y ∗W (h))
vn− n+ 1
= min
h∈Y ∗
fδ(W (h))
vn− n+ 1 =
minh∈Y ∗ f(p(h))
vn− n+ 1 .
(28)
Next, we show that γ(h) < γ(h′) holds for all h ∈ Y ∗ and
all h′ ∈ Yi ∈ Y \ {Y ∗}. According to property (ii) in Lemma
18 and (28), we have
γ(h)− γ(h′)
≤ (n+ 1)
∑
Yj∈Y\{Y ∗}
min
hˆ∈Yj
f(p(hˆ))−
∑
Yj∈Y\{Yi}
min
hˆ∈Yj
f(p(hˆ))
= (n+ 1) min
hˆ∈Yi
f(p(hˆ))− min
hˆ∈Y ∗
f(p(hˆ))
+ n
∑
Yj∈Y\{Y ∗,Yi}
min
hˆ∈Yj
f(p(hˆ))
<
n+ 1
vn− n+ 1 minhˆ∈Y ∗ f(p(hˆ))− minhˆ∈Y ∗ f(p(hˆ))
+
n(v − 2)
vn− n+ 1 minhˆ∈Y ∗ f(p(hˆ)) = 0.
(29)
Thus, it follows from (29) and Lemma 13 that h is stochasti-
cally stable if and only if h ∈ Y ∗.
Regarding (ii), it follows from conclusion (i) and Definition
11 that as  → 0, pih > 0 if and only if h ∈ Y ∗, implying
that only h in Y ∗ can be visited with non-zero probability as
 → 0. Since Y ∗ is the induced RCC of Q∗, the conclusion
directly follows from (10).
The memory subsystem may be required to be of very large
size so that only the joint strategies with maximum cycle-
based metric can be observed with non-zero probability. This
requirement arises because m¯δ in (24) is proportional to L
which can be very large. Sometimes, the size of memory
subsystem has a predefined length, which may be less than
m¯δ . Thus, for this case, we introduce a memory-based metric
in Definition 8.
Next, we propose a class of perturbations such that the joint
strategies with the maximum memory-based metric can be
observed frequently in the sense of stochastic stability. It is
worth noting that Assumption 9 is removed in this case, with
respect to Theorem 22, i.e., the bound of the payoff function
is unnecessary.
Theorem 23 (Maximum memory-based metric). Let G2 =
(N,S, J) be an n-agent meta game on a finite joint strategy
space S. The training system has a memory of predefined
length m ∈ N>0, and consider the memory-based metric
Mm(s) in (6) for each joint strategy s ∈ S. Suppose that
Assumption 21 holds. If the following conditions are all true:
(I) there exists a δ0 > 0 such that Mm(Q∗) ≥Mm(Qi)+δ0
for all sink equilibria Qi ∈ Q \ {Q∗};
(II) f is a δ-feasible function for some δ ∈ (0, δ0);
then under the perturbed SBRD P ,
(i) a history state h is stochastically stable if and only if
h ∈ Y ∗;
(ii) as  → 0, a joint strategy s ∈ S is recorded in the
memory subsystem with nonzero probability if and only
if s ∈ Q∗,
where Mm(Q∗) = maxQ∈QMm(Q) and Y ∗ is the induced
RCC of Q∗.
Proof. According to property (ii) in Lemma 17, W (Yi) =
Mm(Qi) for all Yi ∈ Y . Thus, it follows from the conditions
(I) and (II) that
W (Y ∗) = Mm(Q∗) ≥Mm(Qi) + δ0
≥W (Yi) + δ0 > W (Yi) + δ,
(30)
for all RCCs Yi ∈ Y \{Y ∗}. By following the same argument
(27)-(29) in the proof of Theorem 22, we can obtain that
γ(h) < γ(h′) for all h ∈ Y ∗ and all h′ ∈ Yi ∈ Y \ {Y ∗}.
Thus, the conclusions (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 13 and
the proof of Theorem 22.
E. Approximation of the Maximum Metrics
In this subsection, we remove the prior information about
the lower bound of the difference between the maximum and
second maximum metrics in all sink equilibria, i.e., δ0 is un-
known. This relaxation is important because the condition (I)
in Theorem 22 and condition (I) in Theorem 23 both need such
a δ0 which sometimes is hard to find. Conversely, we introduce
a design parameter δ¯ specifying the difference between the
metric of the sink equilibrium related to the stochastically
stable states and the maximum metric. Thus, the preassigned
parameter δ¯ actually characterizes the stochastic stability of
the joint strategies observed with non-zero probability.
Theorem 24 (Approximation of maximum cycle-based met-
ric). Let G2 = (N,S, J) be an n-agent meta game on a finite
joint strategy space S. The training system has a memory of
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length m ∈ N>0, and consider the cycle-based metric Mc(s)
in (5) for each joint strategy s ∈ S. Suppose that Assumptions
9 and 21 hold. For any given δ¯ > 0, if the following conditions
are all true:
(I) f is a δ-feasible function for some δ ∈ (0, δ¯);
(II) the memory m is not less than m¯δ given by
m¯δ =
2LJmax
δ¯ − δ , (31)
then under the perturbed SBRD P , as  → 0, every joint
strategy s ∈ S which is recorded in the memory with nonzero
probability, belongs to a sink equilibrium Qi satisfying
Mc(s) = Mc(Qi) ≥Mc(Q∗)− δ¯, (32)
where Mc(Q∗) = maxQ∈QMc(Q).
Proof. Take a sink equilibrium Qj from Q. Suppose that
Mc(Qj) < Mc(Q
∗)− δ¯, (33)
where Mc(Q∗) = maxQ∈QMc(Q). We let Y ∗ denote the
induced RCC of Q∗.
Let m¯δ be as in (31). Then, if m ≥ m¯δ , it follows from the
property (i) in Lemma 17 that
|W (Yi)−Mc(Qi)| < δ¯ − δ
2
, (34)
for all RCCs Yi ∈ Y . Then, by (33) and (34), we have
W (Y ∗) > Mc(Q∗)− δ¯ − δ
2
≥Mc(Qj) + δ¯ − δ¯ − δ
2
= Mc(Qj) +
δ¯ − δ
2
+ δ > W (Yj) + δ.
which is similar to (26). By following the same arguments as
in (27)-(29), we have γ(h) < γ(h′) for all h ∈ Y ∗ and all
h′ ∈ Yj ∈ Y \ {Y ∗}. Thus, Lemma 13 implies that for any
h ∈ Yj , h is not stochastically stable.
If h is stochastically stable, it follows from Theorem 4 in
[36] that h is contained in an RCC Yi. The sink equilibrium Qi
related to Yi cannot satisfies (33), because the above analysis
shows that (33) will lead to a contradiction, i.e., h is not
stochastically stable. Thus, we have
Mc(Qi) ≥Mc(Q∗)− δ¯. (35)
The conclusion directly follows from the fact that as  → 0,
only the joint strategies contained in stochastic stable history
states can be observed in the memory with nonzero probability.
Then, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 25 (Approximation of maximum memory-based
metric). Let G2 = (N,S, J) be an n-agent meta game on a
finite joint strategy space S. The training system has a memory
of predefined length m ∈ N>0, and consider the memory-
based metric Mm(s) in (6) for each joint strategy s ∈ S.
Suppose that Assumption 21 holds. For any given δ¯ > 0, if
f is a δ-feasible function for some δ ∈ (0, δ¯), then under the
perturbed SBRD P , as  → 0, every joint strategy s ∈ S
which is recorded in the memory with nonzero probability,
belongs to a sink equilibrium Qi satisfying
Mm(s) = Mm(Qi) ≥Mm(Q∗)− δ¯, (36)
where Mm(Q∗) = maxQ∈QMm(Q).
Proof. This corollary is straightforward by combining the
proofs of Theorems 23 and 24.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced two multi-agent policy evalu-
ation metrics based on the concept of sink equilibrium. The
proposed framework is practical and general in the sense that
it can be easily applied to a large class of stochastic meta-
games. Compared with existing popular evaluation methods,
such as Nash equilibria, Elo ratings and α-rankings, our
evaluation metrics can handle dynamical cyclical behaviors
and are compatible with single-agent reinforcement learning.
In particular, the memory-based metric is realistic settings with
limitations on amount of available memory.
We have shown that learning algorithms designed to seek
coarse correlated equilibria cannot be directly applied to
compute sink equilibria with good properties by demonstrating
that these two concepts are not special cases of each other.
Then, we introduced a training system which consists of a
learning subsystem and a memory subsystem for multi-agent
policy seeking. Under some mild conditions, we proposed
perturbed SBRD algorithms which guarantee that only the
joint strategies with the maximum underlying metrics are
observed with non-zero probability in the memory subsystem.
We also modified the training algorithms for learning joint
strategies with metrics close to the maximum by relaxing some
conditions. Future work involves applying the perturbed SBRD
algorithms in practical scenarios.
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